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Introduction
The global financial crisis that followed the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 highlighted the threat of collapse of financial institutions, alarmed the authorities, prompted large-scale state-funded rescue packages in the euro area 1 , and led to an astonishing increase in banks" credit default swaps (BCDS) 2 . In the first place, those state-funded bank bailouts triggered an unprecedented deterioration in public finances of the world"s major advanced economies in a peacetime period (Hryckiewicz 2014) . 3 In the second place, shrinking public finances provoked fiscal imbalances in the euro area, reflected in the unprecedented increase in sovereign credit default swap (SCDS) spreads.
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Have tax-payer financed, colossal government rescue packages improved banking stability? Or, contrary to the conventional wisdom, have they destabilized the banking sector?
What is the feedback effect -positive or negative -of bank bailouts on public finances, the risk of investment in government debt and the price of insurance against such risk? Is there evidence of regime-dependent interconnectedness between banking and public sector stability? Research into credit default swaps is dominated by the examination of i) the determinants of sovereign credit risk and defaults (Breitenfellner and Wagner 2012 , Aizenman et al. 2013 , Ang and Longstaff 2013 and Beirne and Fratzscher 2013 , ii) the adverse effects to the banking sector during sovereign defaults (Panageas 2010, Acharya and Rajan 2013) , and iii) the cost of bank bailouts to the government (Gorton and Huang 2004; Diamond and Rajan 2005) . Only recently, studies on two-way feedback effects between the risk of default in the banking and public sectors have emerged (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011 , Alter and Schüler 2012 , Acharya et al. 2013 and Gennaioli et al. 2014 . Key in this research 1 The threat of total collapse of large financial institutions provoked large-scale rescue packages, announced by euro area governments in September 2008 in an attempt to increase the resilience of the banking sector. (Attinasi et al. 2009 , Petrovic and Tutsch 2009 , Veronesi and Zingales 2010 , Calice et al. 2013 , Phillipon and Schnabl 2013 2 A credit default swap (CDS) is currently the most popular credit derivative, and it serves as a key indicator for the level of credit risk (for a more detailed information on credit default swaps, see Appendix A). It can be used by investors for hedging and speculation. 3 From 2007 to 2011, the government debt ratio as a percentage of GDP increased in all euro area countries. The increase in the debt ratio was documented to range from 9.3 percentage points (Cyprus) to 62.3 percentage points (Ireland) (Grammatikos and Vermeulen 2012) . 4 In the case of government debt, investors use CDSs to express a view about the creditworthiness of a government, and to protect themselves in the event of a country default or in the event of debt restructuring. Financial markets developed the CDS on government debt as a flexible instrument to hedge and trade sovereign credit risk. Although CDSs on government debt are only a fraction of countries" outstanding debt market, their importance has been growing rapidly since 2008, especially in advanced economies where the creditworthiness of some of these countries have experienced enormous pressure. With the intensified attention, their usage has come under more scrutiny.
3 is the possibility -hitherto empirically unaccounted for by the existing literature -that financial crises and government interventions in the banking sector can alter the structure of such effects thus aggravating the two-way banking-fiscal feedback loop. Uncertainty surrounding future credit ratings is identified in this study as a catalyst for the aforementioned loop. In this regard, our study conceptually resembles Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) , who ascribe financial instability to the role of government interventions.
In an attempt to fill this gap, the first and foremost objective of our research consists of examining the regime-dependent interdependence between the euro area BCDS and SCDS spreads. In particular, we focus on the two-way feedback effects between sovereign and banking sector"s risks in euro area countries. We build on and extend Alexander and Kaeck (2008) , who document evidence of pronounced regime-dependent behavior in the CDS market. Our research also corroborates Riedel et al. (2013) , who identify regime-dependent sovereign credit risk determinants in four major Latin American economies. This methodology conveniently allows testing for the theoretical effects of sovereign defaults on the domestic private (banking and non-banking) sector derived by Sandleris (2014) , and it complements the empirical effects on the domestic banking sector, documented by Correa et al. (2013) .
Further, one could argue that the credit risk was simply metastasized and transferred, through bailouts (Arghyrou and Kontonikas 2012), from the banking to the public sector.
However, only temporary improvement in the levels of perceived credit risk in the banking sector could be witnessed after bank bailouts. Indeed, by the first quarter of 2009, BCDS contracts were traded again at par with SCDS contracts. Since November 2009, several "peripheral" euro area countries, including Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, have faced episodes of heightened turbulence in their sovereign debt markets and thus rising SCDS spreads (Bolton and Jeanne 2011). Hence, not surprisingly, the CDS market has recently received renewed attention from investors, policy makers, regulators and researchers. The ensuing sudden credit squeeze and liquidity dry-up induced stock market investors to seek protection and insurance against the increased probability of default. Thus, there are anecdotal evidences that the CDS market reflects developments in both credit and stock markets.
Against such evidence, our second objective is to achieve a better understanding of the regime-dependent relation between stock and credit markets. Further, the relation between credit and stock markets underscores the effects of stock market variables on credit market variables (see Zhang et al. 2009 , Cao et al. 2010 , Arouri et al. 2014 . While our methodology accounts for information contents of CDS and stock markets, and the stance of a business cycle, we also allow stock market returns and volatility to be endogenously determined by using BCDS and SCDS spreads. To the best of our knowledge this approach is not apparent in the literature. The direction of the interdependence between stock and credit markets has become a bone of contention only recently (Norden and Weber 2009, Hilscher et al. 2013 ). However, evidence on whether and, if so, how CDS spreads are informative about stock market returns and volatility, remains scant (see, e.g., Wang and Bhar 2014) .
Our research significantly contributes to the literature that studies the effects of largescale rescue packages (i.e. government interventions) provided by euro area governments to their national banking sectors on BCDS and SCDS spreads. 5 Our results are supportive of the hypothesis that government interventions in the banking sector lead to a credit risk transfer from the banking to the public sector. Additionally, the results support the two-way feedback hypothesis 6 , and the hypothesis advanced by Gennaioli et al. (2014) and Sandleris (2014) , which states that the expectation of support from national governments allows banks to be more leveraged, and therefore more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Notably, our key contribution is to show that the above mentioned banking-fiscal feedback loop intensifies in a more volatile regime. Overall, we provide novel evidence that large-scale rescue packages do not necessarily stabilize the banking sector, as witnessed by rising BCDS spreads.
Second, we contribute to the literature which studies the relation between credit market and stock market variables (see, e.g. Trutwein and Schiereck 2011; Breitenfellner and Wagner 2012) . The empirical results unambiguously show that an unanticipated increase in BCDS and SCDS spreads provokes a surge in investors" expectations of stock market volatility (as measured by the VSTOXX volatility index), and it leads to a decrease in the EUROSTOXX stock market index. Uniquely and innovatively, the effects of shocks to BCDS and SCDS spreads on the VSTOXX volatility index and on the EUROSTOXX stock index are larger and more significant a more volatile regime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the hypotheses that are tested in this research. Section 3 outlines the methodology. Section 4 describes the characteristics of the dataset. Section 5 analyzes the estimation results. Section 6 presents the concluding remarks.
5 Unlike Alter and Schüler (2012) who model the relation between BCDS and SCDS spreads by means of a single-regime VAR model, the Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression (MSBVAR) model we use sheds light on a significant regime-dependent interdependence between these variables. 6 The feedback hypothesis implies that higher risk premium required by investors for holding government bonds depresses the sovereign bond market, it impairs balance sheets of the banking sector, and it depresses the collateral value of loans.
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The Hypotheses
In this section, we formulate the hypotheses used in our research. 
The Fundamentals Channel Hypothesis
Following Gerlach et al. (2010), and Acharya et al. (2013) , a systemic banking crisis causes a business-cycle recession, which weakens public finances and leads to a higher default risk of sovereign bonds. Financial institutions that suffer unanticipated outflow of deposits and experience funding and liquidity issues in the wholesale market are forced to reduce their lending activity and even to call back existing loans in order to deleverage their balance sheets. This raises the probability of default on banks" liabilities and is associated with an increase in BCDS spread. If funding and liquidity problems become a commonplace in the banking sector, money supply decreases because credit conditions deteriorate (i.e. less credit is available to finance projects in the economy). Thus, a systemic banking crisis prompts a recessionary effect on investment, consumption, income, and adverse effects on 6 public finances. As a result, sovereign credit default risk will increase. Therefore, the first part of the Fundamentals Channel Hypothesis implies that: Following a systemic banking crisis, uncertainty about future economic prospects grows rapidly, driving lower the sovereign creditworthiness (i.e. SCDS spread increases reflecting higher credit risk), and thus, the CDS market enters a more volatile regime. To alleviate perceptions of systemic risk in the banking sector, the government intervenes by acquiring partly or fully the nearly-collapsed banks and re-capitalizes them. As the government effectively increases its share of non-performing assets, public finances deteriorate and consequently the bank"s credit risk is transferred to the public sector (Attinasi et al. 2009 ). In a higher volatility regime, markets penalize fiscal imbalances more strongly than in a less volatile regime, notably before the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Von Hagen et al. 2011) . In contrast to Alter and Schüler"s (2012) research into individual countries" experiences, we argue that the private-to-public transfer of credit risk is also a characteristic at the level of the euro area. We expect that a positive change in both the level and the volatility of BCDS spread will be followed by a positive change in the level of SCDS spread.
The Balance-Sheet Hypothesis
Following Acharya et al. (2013) , the weakening of public finances increases the probability of default on sovereign debt. As the probability of default increases, investors will require higher risk premium on investments in sovereign bonds. Higher risk premium depresses the sovereign bond market and impairs balance sheets of bond holders, mainly banks.
Hypothesis 2.1. A positive change in SCDS spread is followed by a positive change in BCDS
spread.
In the extant literature, most researchers identify that government interventions mitigate the consequences of a systemic banking crisis, since credit risk is transferred to the public sector (Ejsing and Lemke 2011, Dieckman and Plank 2012 In accordance with Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) and Athanasoglu et al. (2014) , who underscore the pro-cyclicality of sovereign debt rating and of the banking sector, an increase in the credit risk on sovereign debt will lead to a greater increase in the banking sector"s credit risk through a reduction in the value of banks" assets and bank retrenchment in a more volatile CDS market regime. Historically, episodes of sovereign defaults that occurred in emerging market economies, notably in Ecuador and Russia, led to large losses in their national banking sectors (see also IMF 2002). In developed economies, stronger financial institutions amplify the adverse effects of sovereign defaults on financial intermediation by allowing domestic banks to boost leverage (Gennaioli et al. 2014 and Sandleris 2014) . Elevated volatility impairs informational contents of the credit default swap market and further raises uncertainty to firms and thus to stock market investors. Consequently, investors will demand higher risk premium in order to invest in stocks of companies that are heavily exposed to bank lending. Alternatively, the uncertainty surrounding future credit rating of sovereign bonds may exasperate expected firm value volatility. This hypothesis is supported by Calice and Ioannidis (2012) who document that the volatility of a bank"s equity value is substantially higher when the CDS market is in a volatile regime.
The Expected Volatility Hypothesis
The Risk Premium Hypothesis
Hypothesis 4.1. Positive changes in the CDS spreads are followed by negative changes in the EUROSTOXX stock index.
An increase in both BCDS and SCDS spreads signals economic hardship similar to Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012) . When BCDS spread increases, banks" bonds lose value and their yields increase to reflect higher cost of capital. As a result, future expected bank cash flows are discounted with a higher discount rate, while simultaneously the stock price decreases, as investors demand higher risk premium to compensate for the increased riskiness of the bank. Higher cost of capital is then transmitted to non-financial companies that rely on bank lending to finance their investment projects. With higher cost of capital, some investment projects become unprofitable and thus are discarded by the company. This places a constraint on the company"s growth prospects, justifying a stock price decrease. Overall, an increase in the BCDS spread is followed by a decrease in the EUROSTOXX stock index.
Similar to Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Sgherri and Zoli (2009) -who underline the importance of credit risk in the pricing of equities -Hypothesis 4.1 assumes that investors become increasingly concerned about the fiscal implications of the global financial crisis driving SCDS spread higher. Consistent with this hypothesis, Calice and Ioannidis (2012) find that bank returns of large complex financial institutions respond negatively to a positive shock to CDS spreads. In accordance with Hypothesis 4.2, Norden and Weber (2004) find that (i) the CDS market is more sensitive to the stock market than the bond market; and (ii) the magnitude of this sensitivity is negatively related to a firm"s average credit quality. Furthermore, downgrades of sovereign bonds can also manifest cross-security contagion effects on stock market returns during financial crises (see also Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002) . Moreover, these downgrades trigger contagion effects on bank stock returns for those banks that investors expect to receive large government support (Correa et al. 2014) .
The Methodology
In Section 3.1, we outline the model that is used in our empirical analysis. In Section 3.2, we describe the estimation method. In Section 3.3, we describe the impulse response functions.
The Model
We employ a Markov-Switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression (MSBVAR) model to study the regime-varying relation between BCDS and SCDS spreads. The MSBVAR model can be specified as ,
where is an N-dimensional vector of dependent variables, is an N-dimensional vector of constants in regime , is a K-dimensional vector of exogenous variables, and are (N x N) and (K x N) matrices of coefficients in regime , respectively, and is an N-dimensional vector of normally distributed structural disturbances uncorrelated at all leads and lags, where . The variance of each structural disturbance is normalized to unity. We assume that all parameters may switch among regimes. The reduced-form disturbances are the structural disturbances pre-multiplied by a regime-dependent matrix .
Consequently, the variance and covariance matrix of is also regime-dependent, as indicated in the following equation:
The regime is assumed to follow a hidden S-state Markov-chain. The probability of being in regime conditional on the current regime is assumed constant. The conditional probabilities that span the regimes are given by the following probability transition matrix :
Where ( ) and ∑ for all .
For , denote * +. More compactly, Equation (1) can be written as
Where ( ) refers to the normal probability distribution function with mean and covariance matrix in regime . The overall log-likelihood function ( ) can be obtained by
where
where is ( ) is the probability density function of conditional to regime , and
The Estimation Method
The optimization of Equation (5) may be performed by means of a suitable extension of an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm described in Hamilton (1994, Chapter 22) and Krolzig (1997) into account the whole distribution available from Bayesian sampling, whereas an EM algorithm can only return a single point from the distribution. Thus, the Gibbs sampler can be viewed as a stochastic version of the EM algorithm 8 .
The Generalized Impulse Response Functions
The Choleski decomposition is typically used in the literature to orthogonalize the reduced-form variance and covariance matrix given in Equation (2). 9 Because this approach is not invariant to the ordering of the endogenous variables in the VAR, Pesaran and Shin (1998) propose an alternative approach that does not have this shortcoming, based on the so-called generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs). Pesaran and Shin (1998) show that for a non-diagonal variance and covariance matrix, the orthogonalized and the (8) and (9), respectively:
It should be noted that Equations (8) and (9) depict net GIRFs, i.e., they assume that there are no further random disturbances in subsequent periods. However, because the BCDS and the SCDS spreads, the VSTOXX volatility index and the EUROSTOXX stock market index feature a slowly moving component and thus follow a high memory process, which is likely to be non-stationary, we transform the endogenous variables in first differences. To measure the responses of the endogenous variables in levels, accumulated GIRFs are utilized, which can be obtained by adding up net GIRFs. It is evident that the contemporaneous accumulated response vector can be still measured by Equation (8). The -step-ahead accumulated response vector is given by Equation (10):
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The long-run response accumulated response is obtain as ̃ ̃ . Then, the long-run differential effect of random disturbance on endogenous variable in regime relative to regime is given by
Equation (11) allows testing if the long-run impulse response of endogenous variable to random disturbance is significantly different across regimes through . An advantage of focusing on the long-run GIRF is that its standard error becomes irrelevant, and statistical inference relies merely upon the value of the GIRF, rather than on the ratio of its value to the standard error, which driven by an arbitrarily chosen number of periods after the shock. Building upon the hypotheses outlined in Section 2, the magnitude of the impulseresponse is greater in a more volatile regime. 10 Therefore, we have:
Data
In the empirical analysis, we use daily data on banks" (iTraxx Senior Finally, fixed-for-floating euro interest rate swaps capture the risk free interest rate and expectations of the future risk free interest rate. Higher risk free interest rate will incentivize investors to invest in risk free assets, thereby decreasing the share of risky assets in their portfolio and decreasing the credit risk. In the risk neutral world, the risk free interest rate constitutes the drift (Merton 1974 Moreover, the slope of the term structure conveys valuable information about the business cycle stance (Estrella and Mishkin 1997) . Specifically, a high slope anticipates an increase in future economic activity (Fama 1984, Estrella and Hardouvelis 1991) . It should also be noted that the use of the level and slope interest-rate swaps is consistent with the literature advocating that co-movement between banks" and sovereign issuers" CDS premia may be driven by a common set of unobserved factors, probably reflecting changing macroeconomic fundamentals (Ejsing and Lemke 2011, Acharya et al. 2013 ).
mean on average by 81.99 basis points, whereas SCDS deviates by only 49.58 basis points.
The two measures of credit default risk are also positively skewed and leptokurtic. The resulting distributions are non-normal, since the normality is rejected by the Jarque-Bera test statistic. The change in the VSTOXX volatility index has a positive mean, suggesting that expectations of stock market volatility increase over the sample period. It experienced significant fluctuations over the sample period, as indicates the range of variation in the standard deviation. The latter indicates that the change in the VSTOXX volatility index deviates from the mean on average by 1.93 index points. The change in the volatility index is also positively skewed and highly leptokurtic resulting in a non-normal distribution of values.
Daily percentage stock returns were negative during the sample period (-0.0032% in daily percentage). Stock returns were highly volatile, as suggests the range of variation and the standard deviation. The latter reveals that stock returns deviate from the mean on average by 1.42%. Consistent with empirical evidence on skewness and kurtosis, returns are negatively skewed and leptokurtic, implying that big negative events in the European stock market are more likely than big positive events and that the density of returns is greater the closer returns are to the sample median. Therefore, the resulting distribution of returns is non-normal. The fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps have positive means ranging from 2.25% (1-year maturity) to 3.76% (20-year maturity). Thus, longer maturity interest rate swaps tend to have a higher rate than shorter maturity interest rate swaps. The converse is true for the range of variation and the standard deviation. Longer maturity interest rate swaps tend to be less volatile. Shorter maturity (up to 4 years) swaps are positively skewed, whereas longer maturity swaps are negatively skewed. Interest rate swaps are leptokurtic and non-normally distributed for all maturities.
-Please Insert Table 2 about here - differences.
-Please Insert Table 3 about here - association with interest rate swaps of different maturities.
Empirical Findings
In Section 5.1, we describe the regimes identified by means of the MSBVAR model.
In Section 5.2, we analyze the estimated effects of endogenous variables by means of impulse response functions. In Section 5.3, we study the estimated effects of exogenous variables. In Section 5.4, we report robustness checks.
Markov Regimes
Key to the MSBVAR model is the identification of switching regimes, governed by a stochastic, unobserved regime variable . The regimes are associated with different conditional distributions of the BCDS and the SCDS spreads, the change in the VSTOXX volatility index and returns on the EUROSTOXX stock market index driven by . The regime-dependent parameter matrix is estimated using the Gibbs sampler, and the probability of each regime (and thus the length of each regime) is endogenously determined.
However, the number of regimes is based on the notion that the dynamic relation between the BCDS and SCDS spreads may be (i) different before and after the subprime-mortgage crisis period (i.e., July 2007), and (ii) different in periods clustered around the various credit events after the subprime mortgage crisis -such as the contagious effects of the collapse of Lehman Brothers -and in periods where those contagious effects deteriorated. Therefore, a parsimonious model that assumes two regimes may fail to distinguish between periods 16 wherein bond investments are highly risky -characterized by uncertainty and volatility -and periods where the riskiness of bond investments is perceived as less critical 13 . Thus, assuming two regimes only, it is possible to omit a portion of relevant information from our empirical analysis and hence the model will become overly restrictive.
Moreover, a model with 2 regimes is likely to lead to misspecification issues when the true number of regimes is in fact higher. Furthermore, our choice for the number of Markov regimes is further supported by Chib"s (1995) method and the method of bridge sampling,
proposed by Meng and Wong (1996) and extended by Frühwirth-Schnatter (2004) . We employ 5000 MCMC draws from a posterior density to compute the marginal log-likelihood values that used to select among various models differing in the number of regimes of the hidden latent variable. Results of Chib"s (1995) and Meng and Wong (1996) methods for four
Markov regimes for the four dependent variables are summarized in Table 4 . From this table,
we observe that the marginal log-likelihood values increase substantially from one to three regimes but then decrease in regime four for all dependent variables. Both Chib"s and the bridge-sampling methods suggest that a model with three Markov regimes fits the data best.
14 -Please Insert Table 4 about here -
We use a MSBVAR model of order 1 to estimate the relation between the BCDS and SCDS spreads, returns on the EUROSTOXX stock index and the change in the VSTOXX volatility index. The vector of exogenous variables comprises the first ("level") and second ("slope")
principal components on the fixed-for-floating Euro interest rate swaps for different maturities (from 1 year to 30 years). All parameters are allowed to change across the regimes.
The variance and covariance matrix is also regime-dependent. The smooth-estimated regime probabilities are presented in red Panels A -C of Figure 2 (bottom plot).
-Please Insert Figure 2 about here -A regime is defined as a region (or polygon) with the highest smoothed probability, i.e.
The estimation results reported in Figure 2 suggest that regime 1 prevails from the beginning of the sample (March 2005) till July 2007 that marks the beginning of the U.S. 13 The choice of the number of regimes has been fiercely debated in the literature. A standard approach is to use 2 regimes (e.g., high and low volatility regimes in financial markets), based on economic rather than on statistical principle. However, it is not uncommon to rely upon a more complex three-regime MSBVAR. An example is Artis et al. (2004) who identify three regimes (recessions, moderate-growth periods and high-growth periods) in the post-war US business cycle. 14 While our main analysis is based on a MSBVAR that assumes the presence of three regimes, we also estimate a MSBVAR with two regimes. 
Endogenous Variables
The main findings are summarized by means of the GIRF (Pesaran and Shin 1998).
The GIRFs for the four shocks are depicted in Panels A -D of On the contrary, it exerts a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX stock index. We find that an increase in the VSTOXX volatility index leads to a significant increase in BCDS and SCDS spreads. This effect is always larger in magnitude in a higher volatility regime. This result is in line with Alexander and Kaeck (2008), who find that higher firm value volatility is more likely to hit a default barrier than lower firm value volatility. Second, we also document that an unanticipated change in the VSTOXX volatility index triggers a direct permanent change in the index level. This effect is larger in magnitude in a higher volatility regime. Third, as expected, higher firm value volatility feeds into higher risk premium that is required by stock market investors. In a higher volatility regime this effect is larger in magnitude, depressing further stock market returns. This explains a negative impulse response of the EUROSTOXX stock index.
-Please Insert Figure 3 Panel C about herePanel D of Figure 3 indicates that an unanticipated change in the EUROSTOXX stock index has a negative effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads, and the VSTOXX volatility index.
In particular, we observe that when a firm"s value depreciates, the probability of default will increase as the firm may not be able to honor its credit commitments. On the one hand, this increases firm"s value volatility, which is represented by a change in the VSTOXX volatility index. On the other hand, the loan default rates increase in the economy as the leveraged firm may not be able to repay its loans. This impairs the performance of banks and spills over to the CDS market. As a result, when the decrease in firm"s value becomes widespread, BCDS and SCDS spreads increase. These results are consonant to some extent with Alexander and Kaeck (2008) who document that a change in a firm"s value has an inverse effect on CDS spreads.
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-Please Insert Figure 3 Panel D about here -
Exogenous Variables
The impulse-response functions can be used to evaluate the effects of shocks to endogenous variables only. However, they do not capture the effects of the first and second principal components that are used as exogenous variables in our research. To evaluate the above theoretical underpinnings, the estimated effects of the first and second principal components in Panel A of Table 5 can be analyzed.
-Please Insert Table 5 about here -
The first (second) principal component can be interpreted as the "level" ("slope") of a risk-free interest rate. An increase in the risk-free interest rate renders risk-free assets (e.g. 
Robustness Checks
Our main findings are supported by several robustness checks. First, following
Alexander and Kaeck (2008), we replace the first and the second principal components with the 5-year interest rate swap ("LEVEL") and difference between 10 and 2 year interest rate swaps ("SLOPE"), respectively. Panel D of Table 5 indicates that the effects of the alternative measures of interest rate level and slope are qualitatively similar to the effects of the first and second principal components. In particular, we find that the 5-year interest rate swap has in general a negative and significant effect on BCDS and SCDS spreads. Our results
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also suggest that the alternative measure of slope in general does not appear to influence significantly the BCDS and SCDS spreads. Fifth, since the VSTOXX volatility index shows some tendency to revert to the mean we also estimate a 3-regime VAR, with the VSTOXX volatility index measured in levels.
The effects of shocks to the BCDS and SCDS spreads, EUROSTOXX stock index and VSTOXX volatility index resemble those reported in Figure 3 and described in Section 5.2. A shock to the VSTOXX volatility index has a positive effect on the BCDS and SCDS spreads, 17 Due to the presence of a unit root, the 5-year interest rate swap is used in first differences. The difference between the 10-year and 2-year interest rate swaps is stationary (features a unit root) according to the ZivotAndrews (ADF, KPSS and PP) test. In Panel D of Table 5 , the slope is measured in levels. As a robustness check, we also estimated our MSBVAR models with a slope measured in first differences. Results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using the measures of level and slope. The results using the measure of slope in first differences are not reported, but are available from the authors upon request.
the VSTOXX volatility index, and it has a negative effect on the EUROSTOXX stock market index. Moreover, this effect is greater in a more volatile regime. The detailed results obtained for our second through sixth robustness checks are not reported but are available from the authors upon request.
Conclusion
This study examines the regime-dependent interdependence between euro area banks"
and sovereign credit default swap (BCDS and SCDS, respectively) spreads, stock and credit markets via using a state-of-art MSBVAR model. The model sheds light on a significant regime-dependent interdependence between these variables. Specifically, our results indicate that government interventions in the banking sector metastasize and lead to credit risk transfer from the banking to the public sector. Furthermore, the results assert the feedback hypothesis, while also imply that the expectation of support from national governments allows banks to be more leveraged, making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults.
Therefore, this study provides novel evidence that large-scale rescue packages do not necessarily stabilize the banking sector, as witnessed by rising BCDS spreads. The increase in BCDS spreads and the subsequent decision of euro area governments to bail out troubled banks triggered an unprecedented increase in SCDS spreads. This decision resulted in greater fiscal deterioration of euro area countries and thus in greater sovereign credit risk (IMF 2013).
We also investigate the regime-dependent relation between the euro area credit and stock markets. According to Sandleris (2014) , such interconnectedness builds upon two intertwined channels through which a sovereign default affects stock markets. First, a sovereign default can trigger a contraction in the credit market (credit channel). Moreover, in the event of a sovereign default, a decrease in investments affects negatively firms" net worth and makes collateral constraints more stringent (investment channel). The interaction and synchronicity between these two channels makes it important to incorporate stock market variables in our study. In response to the issues raised in the introduction, the empirical results provide strong evidence that an unexpected positive change to BCDS and SCDS spreads causes an increase in investors" expectations of stock market volatility, as measured by the change in the VSTOXX volatility index, and advances to a decrease in the EUROSTOXX stock index. In particular, we document a significant rise in co-movement in the post-bailout period between BCDS and SCDS and the VSTOXX volatility index. These findings are supported by the empirical evidence on the effects of changes in sovereign credit 24 ratings on financial instability (Kaminsky and Schmukler 2002) and stock market returns (Brooks et al. 2004 , Correa et al. 2014 . 18 Moreover, we find that the effects of unexpected changes to BCDS and SCDS spreads on the VSTOXX volatility index and on the EUROSTOXX stock index are more pronounced and stronger in a more volatile regime, reflecting an increased incidence of contagion across financial markets. 19 Thus, our research provides also scope for hedging strategies for investments in the Euro Area CDS market.
Indeed, stock market variables, such as the VSTOXX volatility index and the EUROSTOXX stock market index futures can be used to hedge against undesired developments in the BCDS and SCDS spreads. If bank bailouts contribute to instability of financial markets, and sovereign credit rating downgrades have a larger effect on bank equity returns for those banks that are more likely to receive support from their governments, then investors will be willing to buy bank equity only if its valuation is sufficiently low in periods marked by heightened volatility. Admittedly, changes in sovereign credit ratings can simultaneous influence both the CDS market and the stock market, thus generating a co-movement between SCDS spread, stock market returns and volatility. 19 The effects of unexpected changes to BCDS and SCDS spreads on the VSTOXX volatility index and on the EUROSTOXX stock index are more pronounced and stronger in a more volatile regime, reflecting an increased incidence of contagion across financial markets. Following Yuan (2005) and Jotikasthira et al. (2012) , uninformed rational investors are not able to distinguish between selling based on liquidity shocks and selling based on fundamental shocks. Thus, when investors suffer a large loss, they are forced to liquidate their positions in other investments, triggering cross-market portfolio rebalancing. This finding complements Jorion and Zhang (2007) who examine contagion channels between CDS and stock markets. 20 The Gibbs sampler has been seldom used to estimate Markov-switching vector autoregression models. Hamilton and Owyang (2012) is an example.
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in July 2007 (and coincided with the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States), and a high volatility regime that prevailed in the aftermath of extensive government interventions in September 2008.
We document that since July 2007, the CDS market switched from low risk (regime 1) to mainly intermediate (regime 2) and occasionally to high risk regime (regime 3). The transition from low to higher volatility regimes after 2007 indicates that the euro area switched from a period of low sovereign credit risk to that of unprecedented risk disintegration, because the economic crisis affected disproportionally the "periphery"
economies, compared to the "core" German economy. Second, an unanticipated increase in stock market volatility increases bank and sovereign CDS spreads. Third, a decline in the EUROSTOXX raises equity market volatility, sovereign and bank CDS spreads. Finally, we provide novel evidence that the effects accelerated during, mainly, intermediate (regime 2) and high risk regime (regime 3). Hence, our research extends Acharya et al. (2013) by documenting that the two-way effects between banking and sovereign credit risks are stronger in a more volatile regime.
Appendices Appendix A. Credit Default Swaps
Credit default swaps (CDS) are derivative contracts that allow investors in an underlying debt instrument to protect themselves against a deterioration of credit quality and even a default on debt. As its name suggests, the payoff on a CDS depends on the default of a specific borrower, such as a government or a firm, or of a specific security, such as a bond.
The value of this instrument is especially sensitive to the state of the overall economy. For instance, if the economy moves toward a recession, the likelihood of defaults increases and the expected payoff on credit default swaps will rise quickly. The credit default swap was pioneered by JP Morgan in 1994.
In addition to the above, a CDS can be viewed as an insurance contract that provides protection against a specific default. CDSs are not traded on an exchange, however most Although CDSs can be used as insurance against a default, the buyer of protection is not obliged or required to own the named borrower"s debt or to be otherwise exposed to the borrower"s default (i.e. "naked" position). After two counterparties agree on the terms of a CDS, they can "clear" the CDS by having the clearinghouse stand (e.g. the International
Exchange Clear Europe unit) between them.
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Appendix B. Bayesian Updating and Gibbs Sampling
B.1 Bayesian Updating
The probability ( ) in Equation (7) can be updated recursively. The updating procedure involves the following computation:
and collecting in vector ( ), Equation (7) can be written as
After a sufficient number of iterations a Markov chain reaches an ergodic distribution , where the expected regime is independent from the initial condition, and which satisfies (B4)
B.2 Gibbs sampling
According to the Bayes rule, the posterior distribution of conditional on the data is
The parameter matrix is first partitioned into blocks, ( ). Because of the analytical complexity of the posterior density ( ) , there is no analytical solution to ( ) , nor it is possible to simulate from its distribution. To this end, Sims and Zha (2004) suggest using the Gibbs sampler to obtain the joint density ( ). We assume that the conditional posterior densities 2. For and given 
3. Collect the sequence
) and keep only the last values of the sequence.
Step 3 concerns a choice of and . If the initial values ( ) ( ) ( ) are random but are not drawn from the target distribution, the first draws (the so-called "burn-in" period)
are discarded. This is because (i) the first draws may not accurately represent the desired distribution and (ii) successive samples are not independent upon each other but rather form a
Markov chain with some degree of correlation. By contrast, the second draws can be regarded as draws from the true posterior joint density. We set and .
B.3 Priors
In the Gibbs sampler, we use the following priors. For the MSBVAR coefficients , and we use flat priors. As suggested by Chib (1996) , the prior of the transition matrix is drawn from a Dirichlet distribution. For the k th column of P, p k , the prior density is given by
. We use hierarchical priors for variance and covariance matrix. The regimeinvariant variance and covariance matrix is drawn from a Wishart distribution,
, where the first element is a positive-definite scale matrix and the second element is a prior degrees of freedom with .
The regime-dependent variance and covariance matrix is drawn from an inverse-Wishart
B.4 Gibbs Sampler Diagnostics
We also undertake a diagnostic analysis that involves necessary checks if the generated posterior sample is drawn from a stationary distribution. Specifically, we evaluate the convergence of the MCMC simulation by means of the convergence diagnostic (CD) test statistic, proposed by Geweke (1992 If the samples are drawn from a stationary distribution, then the means calculated from the first ( ̅ ) and third ( ̅ ) segments should not be statistically different, and the corresponding test statistic has an asymptotically standard normal distribution:
where and are the numerical standard errors squared. 22 We calculate the test statistic for all the parameters of the model. Our samples have passed the convergence (at the 5% significance level) for nearly all parameters. 23 Results of the CD test are summarized in Table 6 .
-Please Insert Table 6 about here -21 According to Koop (2003, Chapter 4) , the size of the first and third pieces is constrained by ⁄ and ( ) , respectively. 22 The Gibbs sampler can be used to estimate the mean of a generic function ( ). Geweke"s method builds upon the assumption that the nature of the MCMC process and the function ( ) imply the existence of a spectral density ( ) for draws of the function with no discontinuities at frequency 0 (Cowles and Carlin 1996) . Then, for the estimator of , ( )-, ̅ , the asymptotic variance is ( ) ⁄ , referred by Geweke to as the numerical standard error squared, . 23 The mean absolute value of the CD statistic is 0.8354 (at 5% significance level, the critical value is ±1.96), and there are only 6 parameters (out if 123) that do not pass the convergence test. tests for a unit root. Under the ADF, PP and ZA tests, the null hypothesis is that the series features a unit root. Under the KPSS test, the null is that the series is stationary. The ADF (KPSS and PP) test equations comprise a constant (CONST) and both a constant and a trend (TREND), the 5% critical values being -2. 8634 and -3.4145 (0.4630 and 0.1460, -2.8634 and -3.4145) , respectively. The 5% critical values for the ZA test are -4.8000 and -5.0800 under the assumption of a break in the constant (CONST) and in both the constant and the trend (TREND), respectively. The ZA test comprises a constant and a trend, while allowing for a single break in the constant (CONST) and in both the constant and the trend (TREND). The ZA test also provides the estimated break date (BREAK). Asterisk (*) indicates coefficients significant at the 5% or higher level of significance. The sample period is 22/03/2005 -21/06/2013 that contains a total of 2154 daily observations. Geweke (1992) . The null hypothesis asserts that the coefficient is not statistically different in the first and in the third run of a Markov chain. Critical values are drawn from a standard normal distribution. Asterisk (*) indicates coefficients significant at the 5% or higher level of significance.
